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CHAPTER 9

When Is a Diaspora Not
a Diaspora?
Rethinking Nation-Centered Narratives about
Germans in Habsburg East Central Europe
Pieter Judson

With this chapter I want to encourage German historians to broaden
their understanding of the term German beyond a nation-state-cen
tered concept that for too long has privileged the German state
founded in 1871 as the social, cultural, and political embodiment of a
German nation. I suggest that communities in Habsburg East Central
Europe, popularly constructed by German politicians and historians
alike in the interwar period as diasporas, could not possibly have seen
themselves in these terms much before 1918. When such communities
did adopt a more nationalist identity in the post-1918 period, they usu
ally referred back to prewar ideologies for guidance, traditions that
had rarely made their relationship to Germany a necessary component
of community identity. As a consequence of the national humiliations
imposed by the Versailles and Trianon settlements, Germans in Ger
many tended increasingly to characterize such communities as “lost
diasporas,” eliding their fates with those of Germany’s lost territories
in West Prussia and Silesia. Not until the economically depressed
1930S, however, did Nazi propaganda and offers of support (cultural,
political, and financial) to these hard-pressed communities succeed in
creating a new self-understanding among them as diasporas of the
German nation-state. Nazi annexations (Bohemia, Moravia, Silesia,
Southern Styria) and attempted population transfers (Bukovina,
South Tyrol) enabled these communities later and misleadingly to be
remembered by community activists and historians alike as age-old
diasporas, defined primarily by their relationship to Germany.
The use of this term German diaspora as an analytic tool requires a
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critical acknowledgment of that concept’s twentieth-century deriva
tion from the related concept of the territorial nation-state. Like the
terms nation, race, or ethnicity, the term diaspora rests on historically
shifting ideological presumptions. This does not mean that ideas of
diaspora, just like those of race, nation or ethnicity, cannot produce
material and social effects. But it does require the social scientist to dis
tinguish carefully between the ways in which nationalist ideologists
deployed the term diaspora (to argue for a necessary relationship
between those communities and the German state) and the ways in
which those communities understood their own identification as Ger
man. To use the concept German diaspora without interrogating its
potentially normative and nationalist presumptions risks reading con
temporary forms of self- and group identification back onto its inno
cent subjects, for whom such forms of self-identification may have held
little meaning.'
For German historians in the twentieth century, the concept of Ger
man diasporas in East Central Europe seems to have embodied a com
mon-sense logic. Substantial populations of German-speaking people
living outside of the German nation-state in Eastern Europe formed
diasporic communities that looked to Germany to reinforce a sense of
their own cultural identity, historical continuity, and sometimes politi
cal influence. Such communities were often understood both by them
selves and by Germany as the product of successive waves of German
migration or colonization reaching back into the medieval period.
Local rulers, so the story went, had invited communities of German
artisans, merchants, and farmers to settle in particular regions of the
East, often giving these settlers a privileged legal position vis-a-vis local
Slavic populations. The concept of historic colonization underlying
much of the rhetoric about diasporas in the East often functioned to
reassure Germans in the new German state that their national identity
could be defined by a long history of economic success and cultural
superiority.^
Other authors in this volume demonstrate that the ways communi
ties around the world defined themselves as German reflected contin
gent and situational conditions that shaped their particular assertions
of identity rather than some fundamentally authentic historic shared
identity. We should remember this caveat as we examine German
speaking communities situated geographically much closer to Ger
many. Their very proximity to Germany made them useful pawns in
the foreign political dreams of ideologists hoping to realize an
expanded German nation-state after the defeat of 1918. In the post-1918

When Is a Diaspora Not a Diaspora?

221

political landscape these communities may have occasionally flirted
with a self-characterization as linked to the German nation-state. It
was, however, their problematic place within new self-proclaimed
nation-states, not their traditional ways of identifying themselves, that
produced any such characterizations.
As difficult as it might be for us living in a globally nationalized
world to imagine it. East Central Europeans who claimed membership
in a German nation before 1918 often rejeeted any formal relationship
to the German nation-state founded in 1871 and saw no contradiction
in that choice. Confusion around this issue stems partly from the
degree to which nationalists and their agendas in Germany itself dom
inated early writing about German diasporas, interpretations that were
often unwittingly taken up by later historians. Confusion also results
from the ways in which social scientists too often come to view their
own categories for interpreting the past as having had significanee for
the contemporaries who lived them. When we consider those substan
tial communities of German speakers located in the Austrian half of
the Dual Monarchy, where categories unrelated to our contemporary
understanding of nation often shaped personal and community iden
tity, the concept of diaspora takes on far different meanings. Here we
find German nationalists who did not define themselves in relation to
Wilhelmine Germany, who imagined their links with Wilhelmine Ger
many as comparable to their relations to German communities in
other parts of Imperial Austria.3
This chapter will examine two linked phenomena: the implicit
assumption that Central and Eastern Europeans categorized by a cen
sus as German speakers actually shared a common German identity
and the largely post-1918 nationalist presumption that such groups
formed diasporic communities that sought a relationship to the selfproclaimed German nation-state. Such German speakers often did not
think of themselves as Germans before 1918, and even for committed
nationalists, the demands of living in the anational Austrian Empire
made the issue of any relationship to Wilhelmine Germany largely
irrelevant.4
Both the experienee of wartime occupation in the East and the cata
strophic outcome of the war for Germany and Austria-Hungary
helped intensify the popular interest in the Weimar Republic for com
munities of Germans living outside Germany. It created an entirely
new potential for imagining the future of these Germans specifically in
terms of their relationship to the German state, something that would
have been impossible as long as the Habsburg monarchy existed. This
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popular obsession in Germany with the Germans of the East rapidly
replaced interest in Germany’s lost colonial empire, for example, as
Lora Wildenthal has recently demonstrated in her work on German
women’s colonialist organizations. These groups, formerly devoted to
the advancement of German settlement in Africa, often shifted their
focus rapidly to the so-called lost German communities of Eastern
Europe in the years following the war. The intensified promotion of
Ostforschung in Germany and Austria, both in nationalist and aca
demic circles after 1918, reflected a similar trend.5
The outcome of the war also produced a reconceptualization of the
content and significance of German nationality among German-speak
ing communities in East Central Europe. At first German speakers often
responded to the collapse of the Habsburg state by imagining that they
could maintain their traditional community identity within the new
states while shifting their loyalty from Vienna to rulers in the new capi
tal. Elowever, this option soon became impossible, given the ways that
their new rulers conceptualized citizenship rights. German-speaking
communities that had formerly existed within the multinational Habs
burg state were absorbed, often forcibly, into new, self-styled nation
states that defined the term nation in narrow linguistic terms. Their new
rulers quickly labeled these communities as either Germanized
nationals~and capable of reintegration into the Czech, Polish, Slovene,
or Italian nation—or as German nationals—and barred from member
ship in the new nation-state. This latter categorization often justified the
forced expropriation of German community resources, the elosing of
German-language schools, and the banning of German voluntary asso
ciations, even if, as mentioned previously, those German-speaking com
munities offered declarations of loyalty to their new rulers.®
Several German-speaking communities found themselves forced for
the first time to consider their own identities in terms of the German
nation-state, a state that had meant little to them in the recent past.
This was due less to some spontaneous growth in nationalist identity,
loyalty, or renewed interest in Heimat among German speakers and
more to the radical political, social, and economic structural changes
brought about by the postwar order in Central and Eastern Europe. A
reorientation of German speakers in the new Czechoslovakia, Poland,
Romania, or Yugoslavia toward Germany was not automatic, and as
an outcome it was in no way predestined. Several German speakers in
these communities chose to emigrate or flee, and several also assimi
lated to the dominant language group of the new nation-state.^ It is
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worth repeating that the policies of the new rulers, eager to create
nations with which to people their new nation-states, produced a new
sense of identity as “German diasporas” among these communities;
this identity was not solely the initiative of the German speakers them
selves. It was not foreordained that German speakers should in any
way express a particular interest in, or feel any special relationship to,
Germany, just as it was not foreordained that Czech or Polish nation
alists should define national citizenship in their new states in narrow
linguistic terms. Yet their sudden new status as second-class citizens, as
Germans in Czechoslovakia, Italy, Poland, Romania, or Yugoslavia,
made these German speakers more aware of possible links between
their cultural forms of self-identification, a putative national identity,
and the German nation-state.
Often at this moment after the war, German speakers in Habsburg
East Central Europe became German nationals; their communities
developed completely new identities that slowly reframed their inter
ests in terms of their potential relationship to the German state.* Sev
eral other populations in the region experienced a similar reorientation
of identity, among them those now identified as Hungarians in Czecho
slovakia, Romania, and Yugoslavia; Ukrainians in the Soviet Union
and Romania; and Jews everywhere (to name but a few). All found
themselves defined by hostile governments as minority subaltern pop
ulations. They lived uneasily within self-styled nation-states as secondclass citizens or as objects of forceful policies of assimilation, despite
the legal guarantees of the minority protection treaties imposed on the
new nation-states by the victorious powers.^
These communities of German speakers did have a legacy of rhetor
ical and organizational tools at their disposal for making sense of their
new situation. These tools stressed the commonalties of German-lan
guage minority communities in East Central Europe and not their rela
tionship to the German state. For almost three decades German
nationalist activists had worked tirelessly to promote a sense of nation
alist self-identification among different language groups throughout
the Austrian half of the Dual Monarchy. Activists’ efforts to promote
national unity among Germans in Cisleithania, or even a serious belief
in the importance of nation as such, had not always been successful, as
we will see subsequently. Yet whatever their degree of success before
the war, activists left a compelling potential legacy to those in the post1918 world who sought strategies with which to understand their con
dition as national outsiders.
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Nationalization and Its Limits in Pre-1918 Austria
The nationalization efforts that had dominated Austrian public life in
the years before 1914 differed from apparently similar processes that
characterized public life in self-styled nation-states like Germany,
France, or Italy in the late nineteenth century. The Austrian state did
indeed promote the kinds of administrative centralization and social
integration associated with modernization processes elsewhere in
Europe. Yet these policies did not involve the advancement of national
identity to unify a disparate citizenry. Rather, the Habsburg state
made Austrian identity dependent on the individual’s (and later the
group’s) loyalty to the dynasty. Austrian patriotic symbols, rituals,
and festivals served to highlight the overwhelming devotion of an
admittedly culturally diverse population to its monarch. The state
itself remained firmly anational, even as it worked to unify diverse pop
ulations. It did not wish to recognize the possible existence of nation
alities either in statistical surveys or in policy-making.'®
The liberal Austrian constitutions of 1848 and 1867 had recognized
that differences in religion and in language constituted special cases for
ensuring that institutions treat diverse individuals equally, and it was
around the latter guarantee that nationalists built their movements."
Starting with Czech nationalists in the i86os, each movement invoked
the constitutional guarantee of linguistic equality for individuals both
to define its own nationalist goals and to reform as many aspects of
public life as possible. Language use both in the schools and in the
bureaucracy provided the key legal fields for the activism pursued by a
broad range of nationalist political movements. While their activism
was designed to gain for each nation as large a share of state resources
as possible (everything from the right to petition the civil service in
one’s own language to school funds for minority students to bilingual
street signs), nationalists never sought to replace the Habsburg state
with a series of nation-states. Indeed, nationalists often competed with
each other rhetorically to assert their own nation’s greater loyalty to
the dynastic state. Ironically, by 1914, as Jeremy King has so aptly
noted, anational Austrian law had been forced to recognize the exis
tence of nations within Austria rather than the existence of individuals
who spoke different languages. “In a trend with few European paral
lels,” writes King, “the state began to become multinational.”'^
This “multinationalization” of society was the often unintended
result of institutional agreements like the Moravian Compromise of
1905, which sought to diffuse conflict between Czech and German
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nationalists by removing national issues from the realm of politics.
Resources and political competencies in Moravia would now be
divided between the two sides: Germans and Czechs gained separate
school systems, and they voted in separate curias (Czech and German
candidates for political office no longer ran against each other). The
requirement that all citizens self-consciously declare their adherence to
one nation or the other produced an enormous if unintended national
ization of public life. Where before they might have considered them
selves to be “Moravian” (and demand a bilingual, or Utraquist, edu
cation for their children), now Moravian citizens were forced to
assume a national identity as Czechs or Germans.‘3
Not surprisingly, German nationalist activism throughout Austria
had assumed an especially defensive quality from the start. It origi
nated in the 1880s largely as a reaction against perceived legal and insti
tutional inroads made by other linguistic groups at the expense of Ger
man speakers. German nationalism asserted a privileged place for the
Germans within the empire on the basis of their eultural, economic,
and occasionally numeric superiority. To justify German linguistic
privilege, nationalists pointed to statistical evidence that German
speakers paid proportionally far more taxes than anyone else in Aus
tria did. They also promoted a particular cultural understanding of
historic Habsburg expansion in the East as a German colonial or civi
lizing mission. This German nationalism did not, however, include
irredentist yearnings for Anschluss with the kleindeutsch German state
founded in 1871. To the contrary, most German speakers in Austria
who even considered the matter desired little more than a formal polit
ical alliance for Austria-Hungary with Germany. Given a belief in their
own historical mission in the East, given their overwhelmingly
Catholic cultural bent, and given their perceptions of Prussia as cultur
ally Protestant, most nationalists who even thought about the matter
rejected the irredentist (and anti-Catholic) ravings of a Georg von
Sch6nerer.“4
If Austro-German nationalists rejected an identity defined in terms
of their relationship to the Wilhelmine German nation-state, other
aspects of German nationalist culture in Austria also undermined the
notion of a necessary relationship to Germany. Two apparently con
tradictory tendencies helped ensure that German nationalists in Aus
tria left Germany out of any nationalist or political mental equation.
First, the traditional Austro-German liberal view dominant from 1848
through the 1870s (which survived in many forms down to 1945 and
complicated later Nazi policy in the Sudetenland and the Protectorate)
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held that Germanness was an elite cultural quality that could in theory
be adopted by other groups in Eastern Europe as they worked to
improve themselves. In this view Germanness was linked neither to
descent nor to a particular territory but rather to cultural capital. Lib
erals had expected that, even if other linguistic groups maintained their
own folk traditions, they would educate their youth in German and
that their education would assimilate these newcomers into the ranks
of a larger German humanist elite. Although such a large-scale assimi
lation never came to pass, it meant that early German nationalism
lacked the quality of territorialization found among some other
nationalist movements in the empire.'^ Austro-Germans who even
considered the matter were used to thinking of their nation as a quality
rather than as a place, thus relativizing the importance of the Wilhelmine state founded in 1871. Later German nationalists had to create
a link between the specific territory they claimed and their concept of
Germanness.
The second point is that the critical importance of regional loyalties
for German nationalists in Austria before 1914 often tended to relativize any potentially unique role that Wilhelmine Germany might
play. Several interregional nationalist associations worked hard after
1880 to foster a sense of unity among communities of German speakers
(and their territories) spread throughout Austria, but there is little evi
dence to suggest that they came close to accomplishing their goal. As
Laurence Cole has recently demonstrated for the Tyrol, concepts of
German national identity often served highly regionalist ends, assum
ing specific qualities that gave them little in common with concepts of
Germanness in other parts of the monarchy. In the Tyrol, for example,
German nationalism was defined primarily by loyalty to church, to
dynasty, and to the particular provincial interests of the Tyrol vis-a-vis
the centralizing state in Vienna. This put Tyrolean German national
ists bitterly at odds, for example, with their counterparts in Styria, for
whom liberal anticlericalism played a crucial role in self-definition, or
with Bohemian German nationalists, who viewed the central state as
critical to the maintenance of their minority rights against majority
Czechs.'®
Even within the same province nationalist organizations might dis
agree on the fundamentals of identity. The Union of Germans in
Bohemia (Bund der Deutschen in Bohmen), for example, promoted a
racially anti-Semitic definition of the German nation while the German
Union of the Bohemian Woods (Deutscher Bohmerwaldbund)
remained open to Jewish membership and even sported a Jewish exec-
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utive board member. The interregional German School Association
(Deutscher Schulverein) recognized at least tacitly the important role
Jewish private schools played in educating German-speaking children,
where their minority status meant that the state did not fund a Ger
man-language school. The interregional Sudmark, however, con
structed Jews as the racial enemies of Germans. Farther to the east, the
world of German nationalists in Galicia and the Bukovina was almost
completely alien in its concerns to that of German nationalists in the
West. Yet even among such apparently isolated German-speaking
communities as those in the East, to which I will return later, German
community identity did not rest on a concept of diaspora.'?
If regionalist differences slowed the construction of a common Ger
man national movement or even a common sense of self-identification,
a challenge admittedly faced by nationalists in the new Wilhelmine
Reich as well as by those in Austria, other obstacles also stood in the
way of making populations national.'^ Despite some twenty-five years
of successful activism, by 1914 German nationalists consistently
expressed frustration in their aim to achieve a unified and politically
effective German identity among German speakers in Austria. What
they had generally accomplished by 1914 was a considerable national
ization of white-collar professionals such as civil servants, teachers,
service employees, and politicians at all levels of government, whose
interests tended to be more directly impacted by nationalist legislation
than those of other social groups.
This is particularly clear in the cases of teachers and civil servants.
Changes over time in the state’s linguistic requirements for positions in
the local and regional civil service, for example, appeared adversely to
affect the ongoing chances of educated German speakers to obtain
such posts. German nationalists claimed that, as governments adopted
new rules promoting bilingual administration in provinces like
Bohemia, Moravia, or Styria—concessions, apparently, to Slav
nationalist agitation—German-speaking candidates were increasingly
disadvantaged. Slav candidates would more likely be selected for such
posts, it was argued, because they were more likely to be competent in
both their own languages and German, while Germans rarely learned
a Slavic language.'^ These kinds of concerns shaped political agendas
in turn. After 1890 German nationalists increasingly demanded admin
istrative autonomy for purely German-speaking districts within bilin
gual provinces like Bohemia and Moravia in order to free as many
local civil servant posts as possible from the supposedly onerous dual
language requirement. In multilingual regions where administrative
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separation was not viable, nationalist organizations like the Sudmark
in fact changed their strategies by 1909 and began encouraging German
speakers preparing for the civil service to take classes in a Slavic lan
guage. “
If such issues worried some segments of the population consider
ably, they do not appear to have resonated to the same extent with the
majority of German speakers in the empire. Nationalists of all stripes
had far less success mobilizing rural populations or the industrial
working classes for specifically nationalist ends. National identity,
often defined in urban bourgeois terms, had less immediate relevance
to these groups, although it appears to have held a marginally greater
significance to Czech-speaking workers and peasants than to their Ger
man-speaking counterparts.^' German nationalists complained consis
tently about their inability to gain long-term support among both these
social groups, although the nature of their own efforts made them
more likely to succeed among peasants and the rural Mittelstand than
among industrial workers.
In order to fortify existing rural German-speaking minorities against
the gradual “incursions” of other populations, nationalists tried to
strengthen existing minority communities by preventing the rise of
conditions that promoted emigration or assimilation to another lan
guage group. It was not simply a question of avoiding foreclosures on
Germans’ farms by supplying cheap credit. It also meant promoting
educational opportunities in German for rural youth and making sure
that communities had a diverse population of artisans to serve their
basic consumer needs. Several regional associations promoted the eco
nomic well-being of rural German-speaking populations by making
cheap credit available to them, offering free classes on agricultural
innovation, promoting job exchanges, and subsidizing the purchase of
anything from fruit trees to farm implements. Yet for all of these
efforts, it was not clear that nationalists had in fact succeeded in
nationalizing the peasantry and the rural Mittelstand by 1914. In polit
ical terms their efforts did not always produce significantly greater
numbers of nationalist voters in rural constituencies, for example. Nor
did peasants necessarily understand the economic and educational
efforts of the associations in primarily nationalist terms, though often
in welfare terms.
Nationalists did not often attempt a comparable effort in majority
German-speaking industrial regions, where, for example, Slav-speak
ing workers migrated in increasing numbers by 1900. The industrial
working class in turn was largely politically loyal to the Austrian Social
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Democratic Party, an organization theoretically opposed to the chau
vinist interests of bourgeois nationalism. It was not so much their
nationalism that may have prevented German nationalists from mak
ing inroads into socialist political support, however, but rather their
unwillingness to address issues of concern to working-class Austrians.
A series of articles published by the organization Siidmark in 1909 rec
ognized this nationalist inability to speak to the concerns of industrial
workers and warned that, without a mass base to lend it credibility,
German nationalism could not achieve the political influence it hoped
to gain within the empire: “Whenever we demanded of the German
worker that he subordinate his class to his volkisch interests . . . these
so-called volkisch interests often proved to be the class interests of the
mighty who [at that time] dominated the German parties.In the
final years before the outbreak of war, a few initiatives to organize
unions and parties that would bring German workers into the nation
alist movement took shape, but their successes were limited to very
specific regions.^3
German Identities
As previously noted, German nationalist activists rarely mentioned
relations with Germany as a defining or even an important issue. Their
self-identification did not flow from the explicit belief in a significant
relationship to Germany but rather from the situation of German
speakers in Austria. While there might exist a self-styled German
nation-state to the north and west of Cisleithania, the fact remained
that over ten million German speakers lived under Habsburg rule and
many considered themselves part of a larger German nation that was
not defined by the territory of Wilhelmine Germany. An examination
of the way nationalist organizations defined their goals demonstrates
that when German nationalists thought about the German nation it
was in a way that did not privilege Germany. And as much as the
wartime alliance between Germany and Austria-Hungary sparked the
collective imagination of Austro-German nationalists, causing them to
reimagine their present and future relationship to the Wilhelmine
Reich, this did not in most cases spur a revaluation of the special con
cerns of Austro-Germans.^4
In 1912 the combined membership of regional and interregional Ger
man nationalist associations in Austria (including Bosnia-Hercegowina) stood at some 560,000.^^ xhe largest and best known of these orga
nizations was the interregional German School Association, which
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counted some 200,000 members. Founded in 1880 the association saw
its work very much in terms of updating, so to speak, a traditional Ger
man colonial or settler presence in Eastern Europe. Its mission state
ment deplored the recent losses by Germans to Slav and Italian peoples
in an imagined demographic battle on the linguistic frontier. The Ger
man School Association proposed to minimize further losses by fund
ing German-language schools for linguistically mixed communities
whose German-speaking population was too small to qualify them for
a state-funded German-language school.^^
German School Association literature spoke in terms of losses and
gains for a larger German nation, but one that was rarely defined by
political boundaries. Instead, the association focused its efforts on the
issue that supposedly united all German speakers in Austria: their role
as guardians of a cultural frontier. The association defined this fron
tier, however, in terms of its cultural and historic relationship to
Vienna and not in terms of any relationship to the Wilhelmine Reich.
Association writers occasionally analyzed Wilhelmine German atti
tudes or policies toward so-called Polish incursions in East Prussia, for
example, but always for comparative purposes and never to suggest
that Austro-Germans somehow belonged to Germany. Furthermore,
when writers traced the historic origins of German communities in
Bohemia, Galicia, or the Bukovina, among others, they referred to
German migrations in terms that emphasized their regional origins
(Swabia, Bavaria, Saxony) and played the notion of the Wilhelmine
Reich as a point of origin. Thus, despite the very different linguistic
composition of their respective populations, Germany and Austria
were treated in the pages of the German School Association magazines
as sibling German states with complementary missions in Europe.
Another issue helped shape the sense of Austro-German identity
negatively as it might relate to Wilhelmine Germany. Several Czech
nationalist organizations consistently accused their German national
ist opponents of constituting advance columns for Reich German pen
etration. Reich Germans, it was insinuated, funded the German School
Association. Such accusations implied that any popularity enjoyed by
the association was illusory, the creation of powerful foreign interests.
Czech nationalists hoped to diminish any sense of legitimacy or popu
larity that might attach to the German School Association in Bohemia
by implying that it was a foreign organization largely funded from
across the border.^’
Over its almost forty-year existence the German School Association
built or offered financial support to hundreds of kindergartens, pri-
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mary schools, and advanced schools for boys and girls throughout the
empire. The association was careful, however, to avoid any rhetoric
that might imply a mission to Germanize. It always defined its purpose
in defensive terms, to remedy losses, strengthening the nation through
German-language schooling so that no German children would be lost
to another nation. The association was happy to accept students of
Czech or Slovene parentage who wished their children to obtain an
education in German, but it refuted accusations that it proselytized or
pressured parents to enroll their children in its schools.^^ Czech and
Slovene nationalists who supported the work of similar organizations
of their own in turn accused the German School Association of out
right Germanization. Both German and Czech nationalists constantly
battled over children in linguistically mixed communities, complaining
that employers and landlords exerted undue pressure on parents to
enroll their children in the wrong school. This competition had the
unintended if salubrious effect of dramatically increasing the numbers
of schools, particularly in rural areas, and raising the general level of
literacy and education among those populations where nationalist
competition was at its fiercest.^^
Other nationalist organizations focused their efforts on securing the
economic survival of German communities as well. How these organi
zations defined both their purpose and the specific problems they
hoped to address reveals a great deal about their imagined relationship
to a larger German nation. In Habsburg East Central Europe the sup
posed language frontiers (Sprachgrenze) mentioned previously, where
speakers of two or more languages lived in close proximity to each
other, were usually imagined to be located in rural regions. Within
these areas the towns tended to have a German-speaking plurality,
while speakers of other languages dominated the surrounding rural
areas (thus the German linguistic term Sprachinsel, or “language
island,” to describe such communities, which the editors of this volume
have translated as “islands of Germanness”). In fact, mixed-language
regions might be a more appropriate term for these areas, since their
inhabitants generally could communicate in more than one language
and families often included speakers of both languages. Such familial
and social mixing was anathema to most nationalists, who saw it as a
sign of demographic weakness. If an individual were bilingual, then
what would prevent him and his children from crossing over to the
other side?3°
Clearly an education in the appropriate language would help to pre
vent this national tragedy. So would the economic measures men-
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tioned previously, those designed to keep rural communities viable and
to prevent the enemy nation from practicing a kind of nationalist
blackmail by means of boycotts or hostile housing policies. Both sides
in such situations justified their own use of boycotts or selective hous
ing in defensive terms, and both worked to prevent the other from
gaining an economic upper hand. It is difficult to say with any certainty
whether local populations paid much attention to nationalist exhorta
tions to boycott. In addition to promoting economic stimulants (any
thing from local tourism to the fruit trees and farm implements), these
associations also engaged in charitable activities, handing out Christ
mas presents to the poor, collecting clothing and food for the winter, or
creating small local libraries. They constantly extended their realm of
activism, attempting to nationalize all aspects of private and public life
and thereby to realize the separation between cultures that they
claimed already existed. These efforts became increasingly ambitious
after 1900, so much so that in many cases the associations overstepped
the very limits of their defensive origins in order to proclaim aggressive
new projects.^'
The Union of Bohemian Germans extended the demographic
metaphor to the issue of German orphans supposedly raised in Czeeh
orphanages and thus lost to the German nation. The union built pri
vate orphanages to save German children for the nation. Several other
regional organizations followed the union’s example, although most
relied more on the less expensive option of “orphan colonies,” villages
where children were lodged with German foster parents. The Siidmark,
operating primarily in Styria, Carinthia, and Krain, targeted a series of
villages to the north of the Styrian city Marburg for German settle
ment. A large majority of Marburgers spoke German, but the city itself
was cut off demographically from the German-speaking territory to
the north by a swathe of rural villages inhabited both by Slovene
speakers and a minority of German speakers. The Sudmark hoped
eventually to use its settlement program to Germanize the area directly
to the north of Marburg and thus connect the “island” city to the Ger
man “mainland.” The organization bought properties as they became
available and sold them at reduced rates to farmers and artisans
(largely Protestants from Wurttemberg in the German Reich, a fact
that created unanticipated problems in overwhelmingly Catholic vil
lages). Other regional organizations, such as the Nordmark (operating
in Silesia), attempted to emulate this settlement program.3^
In both these cases nationalist associations adapted the rhetoric of a
tradition of German colonialism and settlement to more modern ends.
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If, according to this rhetoric, Germans had been invited to colonize
areas of Eastern Europe centuries ago because their economic habits
and cultural superiority were recognized by local rulers, modern Ger
mans too must pursue a similar cultural mission to prevent uncultured
barbarians from ruining Austrian civilization. Here we must be careful
to note the situational uses of colonial and settlement rhetoric on all
sides. German historians may be surprised to learn that Slavic nation
alist groups also engaged in discourses of colonialism and cultural
superiority against the Germans when it suited their purposes. In par
ticular, Czech nationalists portrayed Czech migrants to German areas
as courageous colonizers, settling new regions within the lands of the
Bohemian crown. Czech nationalists took every opportunity to tout
their own cultural achievements and to contrast their own status as a
modern Kulturnation to the often uncultured, loutish, and violent
behavior of German nationalists.33 At other times, Czech nationalists
liked to characterize the activities of their German nationalist rivals in
terms of a brutal colonial relationship between Germanizing colonizer
and Czech colonized. Some German nationalists too constructed their
mission, as we have seen, in terms of bringing culture to a benighted
East. At other times Germans might lament the fate of helpless Ger
man minorities at the hands of invading Czech colonizers who over
turned traditional existing social relations. The legacies of these tropes
are particularly apparent among some Czechoslovakian Sudeten Ger
mans in the 1930s and, interestingly, reemerge with particular vehe
mence after their annexation to Germany in 1938. Sudeten German
leaders and organizations frequently demanded special treatment for
their followers due to their recent history of colonization, both real and
imagined, at the hands of the merciless Czech nation-state.34
Every one of these claims reflected a strategic use of existing rhetor
ical opportunities, although it should be clear that both those oppor
tunities and the signiflcance of the rhetoric reflected changed realities
after 1918. While those categorized as German nationals after 1918 may
have suffered under their new rulers, we should not accept the often
self-contradictory claims of either side on this issue as an accurate
reflection of social, economic, and cultural relations in the Austrian
Empire. Nor should we accept the ludicrous thesis that under the
empire one side reproduced the kinds of relations that characterized
European colonialism outside of Europe in its treatment of the other
side. To do so would be to fall into the trap laid for us by nationalists
themselves, to believe the myths about this earlier period propounded
by German nationalists in post-1918 Germany or Slavic nationalists in
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the successor states. We do not have to look far for evidence that social
relations among so-called nations were not as simple as the nationalists
implied. The testimony of the latter provides plenty of evidence for the
challenges faced by nationalists in a ffustratingly nonnationalist world.
Both the Union of Germans in Bohemia and the Sudmark, for exam
ple, experienced considerable difficulties in realizing their nationally
more aggressive schemes, difficulties that suggest the fundamental
chasm that separated nationalist claims about society from reality.
When both the league and its Czech nationalist counterparts actually
investigated their own orphan placement programs, they occasionally
found that a supposedly reliable foster family was in fact raising the
child in the wrong language or that the family’s knowledge of the
national language was woefully inadequate. Families needing the extra
funds simply claimed to be German or Czech, without perhaps grasp
ing the freighted meaning of such an assertion. Similarly, the Sudmark
experienced more than a little difficulty in determining whether a can
didate for a farm was in fact an “authentic German” or simply a Ger
man-speaking opportunist looking for a good deal.35
This set of problems reflects a larger contradiction faced by all
nationalist organizations in the empire, one whose dimensions are
illustrated by nationalist activism around the imperial census. Every
ten years the empire carried out a census that included questions about
language use. Nationalists liked to claim that language use as docu
mented in the census indicated a form of national self-identification,
and activists for each nation struggled to raise its census numbers rela
tive to the others.German nationalists claimed, for example, that
those who listed German as their language of daily use in the census
questionnaires were in fact Germans. More often than not, however,
nationalist organizations spent their sizeable resources trying to con
vince German speakers themselves to become Germans. Their broad
construction of German identity that included everyone who listed
German on the census often papered over even deeper contradictions,
since some nationalist organizations, for example, denied membership
in the nation to Jews who claimed German as their language of daily
use in the census. Nationalists might well refer to nations as if they
were easily recognized and defined phenomena. Reality suggested that,
to the extent that they existed at all, nations were remarkably illdefined, unstable entities.
Although nationalist organizations claimed to strengthen the threat
ened border or island populations of Germans in particular, most of
them functioned in regions that were geographically not very far
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removed from majority German-speaking regions of Austria (and Ger
many). There were some exceptions to this norm, one of which is par
ticularly instructive regarding the question of diaspora and identity:
the Association of Christian Germans in the Bukovina (Verein der
christlichen Deutschen in der Bukovina). This organization tells us
something about how German nationalists on the eastern periphery of
the empire understood their Germanness and in particular how they
imagined a relationship to the rest of a German nation. Unlike Ger
man nationalists in the other contested regions, nationalists in the
Bukovina, Galicia, or Bosnia-Herzegowina could trace their very exis
tence to relatively recent migrations. In Galicia the power of the tradi
tional Polish elite and its largely uncontested policy of Polonization,
particularly in regard to education, meant that German nationalists
there organized late and in relatively small numbers. German speakers
had made up 5 percent of the Galician population in 1880, but by 1910
that number had shrunk to just over i percent. Local German nation
alist efforts succeeded more easily among Galicia’s German Protestant
communities than among German-speaking Catholic ones, since Pol
ish identity was intrinsically defined by a Catholic religious identity.37
In the more interesting case of the Bukovina one could argue that no
linguistic group was socially or historically dominant, although some
were more dominant than others. The Bukovina was in fact Austria’s
“most multicultural” province. Once the Bukovina had gained admin
istrative independence from Galicia after 1848 (and again in the 1860s),
the former Polish elite became a tiny and relatively powerless minority
(3.5 percent) next to a majority of Ukrainian (Ruthene) speakers (38
percent) and Romanian speakers (34 percent), followed by a significant
German-speaking minority of over 20 percent. The German-speaking
presence in the Bukovina dated from as recently as the 1780s, when
under Joseph II German farmers had migrated east to regions recently
annexed from Romanian boyars and divided by the Habsburgs with
the Ottomans. Already in the early nineteenth century the cities and
larger towns of the Bukovina had a particularly large German-speak
ing presence. In Czernowitz, the capital, 47 percent of the inhabitants
reported German as their language of daily use in 1900. Here also the
government established a German-speaking university, thanks to the
tireless efforts of a (Romanian-speaking) parliamentary deputy from
Czernowitz, Constantine Tomaszcuk. Both the new university and the
provincial administration served as something of a magnet for an edu
cated German elite. Once the administration of the Bukovina had been
separated from that of Galicia, the German language became one of
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the two official provincial administrative languages, next to Romanian
(Ukrainian was later added to the official list of official provincial lan
guages as well). Business in the Diet was generally conducted in Ger
man or Romanian.
These structural factors help to explain what may seem paradoxical:
that in a place geographically so far removed from other German com
munities in the empire, German speakers felt little need for connection
either with each other or with a possible imagined German homeland
back in the West. Most German-speaking communities in the Bukovina had little sense of belonging to a larger national community at all,
despite their relatively recent arrival there. This is partly because rural
Bukovina remained relatively cut off from the towns until well into the
twentieth century. German-speaking farmers lived in unconnected
rural communities dispersed throughout the Bukovina. The more
urbanized and educated German speakers were primarily Jews, who
constituted well over half of those statistically categorized as German
speakers in the province. Non-Jewish German speakers, university
professors, white-collar workers, and some merchants formed more of
a German social community in cities like Czernowitz but do not seem
to have viewed themselves as constituting a diaspora. This resulted
from the fact that German speakers exercised proportionally as much
(if not more) influence in provincial political and social affairs as did
any other group. And unlike the situation in the rest of Austria, a sense
of pragmatism rather than ideology or mutual suspicion characterized
political relations between Jewish and Gentile German organizations
in the Bukovina. In fact, relations among nationalist groups in the
Bukovina were generally more manageable than elsewhere in the
monarchy. Since no one group held a majority in the Diet, the German
speakers often played a pivotal role allied either with the Romanian
nationalists (most of the time) or with the Ruthenes.
For this reason, an interesting tension seems to mark accounts by
German nationalist writers in the West of the Association of Christian
Germans in the Bukovina. The former often presented the organiza
tion to their readers as if its very raison d’etre lay in a bitter conflict
that divided Germans and Jews in a barbarous eastern setting. In writ
ing about the origins of this organization, for example, the anti-Semitic
German nationalist Deutsche Volkszeitung in Reichenberg saw the
association’s mission as the liberation of so-called Aryan Germans in
the Bukovina from the financial thrall in which Jewish moneylenders
held them. The organization itself, however, claimed that its appella
tion of Christian was meant to differentiate it from Jewish Germans as

When Is a Diaspora Not a Diaspora?

237

much as its appellation of German functioned to differentiate it from
Catholic Poles. It treated Jews as fellow German speakers who were,
however, organized in a different set of social and cultural networks.3^
The efforts of the association, founded and led largely by professors
at the university in Czernowitz, focused on raising the educational
opportunities for German speakers in a region that suffered from some
of the highest illiteracy rates in the empire. In particular, the associa
tion hoped to encourage rural Germans to send their children to higher
institutions of learning by providing housing and social support to
youth from the country who attended the urban middle and high
schools and the university in Czernowitz. The association also founded
a chain of rural credit unions to battle peasant indebtedness to usurers,
which was indeed high, but as far as I have been able to determine, its
literature never associated Jews explicitly with this particular problem.
In fact, the literature published by the association makes no mention at
all of Jews, Jewish associations, or anti-Semitism.
The association made clear that it wished to inculcate German
speakers with an understanding of their place in a larger German
nation. Viewed from the perspective of Czernowitz, Kimpolung, or
Radautz, however, that larger German nation often seems to have
referred to a collectivity of German speakers within the Bukovina
itself, as the easternmost outpost of the German nation within Austria.
The association’s literature made no mention of Germany. Organizers
did not conceive of themselves defensively as a threatened island of
German culture in a sea of barbarous Slavs and Romanians the way
German nationalists in the West often portrayed them. The associa
tion promoted a sense of German pride of place in the Bukovina,
depicting the society as a microcosm of Austria, a community admit
tedly made up of several nations. This type of identification clearly
grew out of the circumstances created by Imperial Austrian rule, a
form of rule that did not define a privileged majority nation against
minority populations in this region.39
After World War I, when Romania gained control over the Bukov
ina, the organized German community attempted to deal with the new
government in the familiar terms to which it had become accustomed
under the Austrian Empire. German leaders expected that their
schools and cultural and political organizations would continue to
flourish in a multicultural province of Romania, and they saw no con
tradiction between their identities as Germans and their necessary loy
alty to a Romanian state. Although the new regime officially accepted
the written demands made upon it by elected representatives of the
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German community in 1918, government policy toward minority
schools and cultural organizations became increasingly repressive dur
ing the interwar period. It was largely as a result of this growing repres
sion and of fears about the proximity of the Soviet Union that many in
the Bukovina’s German community turned to Nazi Germany for sup
port. A growing factionalism in the 1930s divided German community
institutions, pitting those who demanded a “volkisch renewal” of the
community and political orientation toward Nazi Germany against
those who continued to seek accommodation with the Romanian state.
With the invasion of the region by the Soviet Union in June 1940, the
German community largely agreed to its resettlement in occupied
Poland and later Germany.^®
After 1918
When German nationalists in East Central Europe sought rhetorical
and organizational models to deal with their new and unprecedented
situation after 1918, they generally turned to the strategies that seemed
to have served them well under the Habsburg monarchy. This required
a renewal of self-help organization, appeals to the international com
munity for justice, and implicit attempts at accommodation with the
new national governments. Since they saw themselves more as legiti
mate players on the local political scene than as threatened outposts of
an embattled Germany, they did not immediately redefine their
activism in relation to Germany. Their adoption of prewar ways of
thinking about the nation, derived from experience in a multicultural
empire, made it difficult for these communities to redefine themselves
successfully in terms of a necessary relationship to the Weimar or Nazi
German state. So too did the apparent economic weakness and politi
cal isolation of that German state in the early 1920s. This was as much
the case with a group as politically influential as the so-called Sudeten
Germans in Czechoslovakia as it was with smaller minority communi
ties in Yugoslavia, Poland, and Romania, although the latter were
often subjected to greater violence and more punitive state measures
than were the Sudetens.
Economic depression brought a greater nationalist radicalism in the
successor states in the 1930s. Traditional conservative regimes found
themselves pressured to assert their nationalist credentials more
aggressively or face challenges from restive populist movements. To
many German observers, with their minority status perspective in the
successor states, the accession of the Nazis to power in Germany
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seemed to reflect a powerful national renewal that might serve as a
forceful ally in pursuing their minority rights. This suggested poten
tially new avenues of redress that had not previously been available.
Nowhere was this more clearly the case than in Czechoslovakia, where
under pressure from a badly failing economy German speakers
deserted their traditional parties for Henlein’s Nazis. And yet even
here the old legacies of a different kind of nationalism continued to
shape local concerns and demands made by German communities.
Some Sudeten German activists in the 1930s who supported a full
annexation of the Sudetenland claimed that the broader German
speaking population in Czechoslovakia had so little understanding of
the importance of its German identity that within a generation all sense
of its German national identity would be lost. Once Germany had
annexed the Sudetenland and asserted protectorate status for the rest
of Bohemia-Moravia, Sudeten leaders continued to cast their particu
lar demands on the state in terms that referred to debates from the
Habsburg past. Thus in demanding that schoolteachers in particular
not be called up to the Wehrmacht, German nationalists in the Sude
tenland maintained that the Volk was not yet fully German and
required an education in its own identity. Echoing the nineteenth-cen
tury characterization of the schoolteacher as the instrument of the
nation in the face of Czech attacks, activists claimed that, with German
teachers serving in the ranks, the Volk would be left to the mercy of
Czech-speaking teachers. As late as 1941, German nationalists in
Bohemia still felt the nation had not adequately been forged!^'
Is it possible that we can only truly speak of German diasporas in
Habsburg East Central Europe as an important element of memory
after the brutal expulsions of 1945? In a sense the expulsions created the
German diaspora communities within Germany that had not previ
ously existed as such. I have argued that the vibrant communities of
German speakers that dotted the landscapes of pre-1918 Habsburg
Europe did not constitute German diasporas in the narrow sense
because they did not define themselves in terms of a relationship to a
German state. While they often may have seen themselves as German
by 1914, we must be careful to locate exactly what that appellation
actually meant to them. It seems yet another irony that Imperial Aus
tria, a state that produced so much German nationalist activism, also
produced a sense of German identity so unconcerned with its potential
relationship to its German nation-state neighbor.
The Habsburg state enabled battling nationalists to live in extreme
tension with one another even as it offered a powerful guarantee for
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the survival of each. This assertion has become something of a cliche,
and it should not be confused with the notion that an idealized Habsburg state functioned justly in every situation or that despite all
appearances to the contrary the state had somehow “solved” its
nationalities problems. Still, in order to promote its own survival the
Austrian state had no choice but to dispense a kind of proportional
justice to the increasingly important nationalists who peopled its terri
tories. In doing so it unknowingly legitimized the existence of nations
in the public sphere. Yet it did so in a context that promised to protect
the rights of each. This promise in turn fueled nationalist activism,
since some remote area of public life always remained that required
further reform. This promise also framed the terms of nationalist polit
ical activism in ways that would have been impossible in the context of
a nation-state. An understanding of how people viewed the signifi
cance of nation within this kind of framework remains elusive to us. It
is close to impossible for inhabitants of our own nationalized world
either to recapture or to understand what “nation” might have meant
in a nonnationalized world.
While nationalist activism appeared to dominate politics in the
Austrian Empire by 1914, this had not necessarily produced a mass
society of nationalized individuals. Outside the political system, which
was admittedly awash in nationalist activism, it is simply not clear to
what extent people adopted or acted upon nationalist forms of selfidentification. The concept of an Austro-German border identity pro
moted by nationalist associations and popular authors, for example,
did not necessarily reflect the actual experience of those who lived in
linguistically mixed regions, unless political agitation had shaped the
inhabitants’ views of their own situation. Even where nationalism
clearly dominated social and cultural life, as it did in Bohemia,
regional concerns often shaped particular forms of German selfidentification, and this made these forms different to the point of
unrecognizable to Germans from different regions. National identity
only made sense if cast in a way that highlighted regional concerns
and traditions. Whether or not German speakers in Austria explicitly
proclaimed it, their Germanness was fundamentally defined by their
Austrianness as well as by their particular region, not by their imag
ined relationship to Wilhelmine Germany. After all, even the
Bohemian German politicians who in 1918 opposed their annexation
by the new Czechoslovakia demanded to remain a province of Ger
man Austria (Deutsch Osterreich), and not Anschluss with Germany.
To speak of the Germans in the Austrian Empire as constituting a
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self-conscious unified group, therefore, is a problematic venture, to
say the least. To speak of German diasporas before 1918 is even more
problematic.
The term German diaspora as it is applied to communities in Habsburg East Central Europe (and perhaps others) must refer somewhat
to the self-understanding of these communities. And these communi
ties existed in a world where German identity, to the extent that it held
meaning for people, did not refer to the German nation-state. If, there
fore, interwar German nationalist politics in East Central Europe were
constructed in Brubaker’s triangular terms (diaspora-host nation—
Germany), it is the rise of this new way of conceiving nationalist poli
tics that requires further explanation. New attitudes and approaches to
nationalist activism and identity management had to be forged. They
were not simply given by the political situation. If Germans in formerly
Habsburg Central Europe came to see their identities defined in terms
of a relationship to the German state, then that development must be
explained; it cannot simply be presumed. As German historians reex
amine Germany’s relationship to its Eastern neighbors, they will need
to do this from a perspective of the East itself and not simply from the
perspective of the West.

Notes
1. Rogers Brubaker has usefully pointed to the dangers involved when we
move from treating groups as descriptive or analytic categories to accepting them
as something real. See “Ethnicity without Groups,” Archives Europeenes de Soci
ologit (May 2002): 163-89.
2. Interest in these German-speaking communities of Eastern Europe flour
ished within the limited boundaries of nationalist and sometimes specific religious
circles in the Wilhelmine Kaiserreich. Ronald Smelser, The Sudeten Problem,
^933~^93^' Volkstumspolitik and the Formulation of Nazi Foreign Policy (Middletown, Conn., 1975), 14-69; Michael Burleigh, Germany Turns Eastwards: A Study
of Ostforschung in the Third Reich (Cambridge, 1988). A typical example of such
writing in the 1930s is Erwin Barta and Karl Bell, Geschichte der Schutzarbeit am
deutschen Volkstum (Dresden, 1930). Barta and Bell, both German nationalist
activists from Austria, recounted the history of German nationalist organizing in
communities in Habsburg Austria as a prelude to understanding these communi
ties as diasporas of the larger German nation-state.
3. See the useful recent survey of German literary, cultural, and political texts
by Jorg Kirchhoff, Die Deutschen in der Osterreichisch-Ungarischen Monarchie:
Ihr Verhdltnis zum Staat, zur Deutschen Nation und ihr Kollektives Selbstverstdndnis (1866I67-1918) (Berlin, 2001).

242

The Heimat Abroad

4. The 1910 census counted 9,950,678 people in the Austrian half of the Dual
Monarchy who listed German as their preferred language of daily use (Umgangsprache), 35.58 percent of the total population. Peter Urbanitsch, “Die Deutschen
in Osterreich. Statistische-deskriptiver Uberblick,” in Die Habsburger Monarchie,
i848-igi8, vol. 3, Die Volker des Reiches, ed. Adam Wandruszka and Peter Urban
itsch (Vienna, 1980), 38, table i.
5. On the social, cultural, and political effects of German wartime occupation
and activism on the Eastern front, see Vejas G. Liulevicius, War Land on the East
ern Front: Culture, National Identity, and German Occupation in World War I

(Cambridge, 2000); Paul Weindling, Epidemics and Genocide in Eastern Europe,
i8go-ig45 (Oxford, 2000); and Lora Wildenthal, German Women for Empire,
i884~ig45 (Durham, N.C., 2001), especially 172-200. For the subtle transforma
tions in ideological positioning after 1918, see Barta and Bell, Geschichte der
Schutzarbeit.
6. See Irina Livezeanu’s exemplary analysis of the Romanian takeover of the
Bukovina in Cultural Politics in Greater Romania: Regionalism, Nation Building,
and Ethnic Struggle, igi8-iggo (Ithaca and London, 1995), 49-87. See also Arnold
Suppan, “Untersteierer, Gottscheer, und Laibacher als deutsche Minderheit zwischen Adria, Karawanken und Mur (1918-1948),” in Deutsche Geschichte im Osten
Europas: Zwischen Adria und Karawanken, ed. Arnold Suppan (Berlin, 1998); Hel
mut Rumpler and Arnold Suppan, eds., Geschichte der Deutschen im Bereich des
heutigen Slowenien i848-ig4i (Vienna and Munich, 1988); Jeremy King, Budweisers into Czechs and Germans: A Local History of Bohemian Politics, i848-ig48

(Princeton and Oxford, 2002); and Johann Wolfgang Briigel, Tschechen und
Deutsche, igi8-ig38 (Munich, 1967).
7. For examples, see King, Budweisers, 158-68; Arnold Suppan, “Lage der
Deutschen,” in Geschichte der Deutschen, ed. Rumpler and Suppan, 173-75.
8. Karl F. Bahm, “The Inconveniences of Nationality; German Bohemians,
the Disintegration of the Habsburg Monarchy, and the Attempt to Create a ‘Sude
ten German’ Identity,” Nationalities Papers 27, no. 3 (1999); 377-99; Pieter M. Judson, “Frontier Germans; The Invention of the Sprachgrenze” in Identitdt-KulturRaum: Kulturelle Praktiken und die Ausbildung von Imagined Communities in
Nordamerika und Zentraleuropa, ed. S. Ingram, M. Reisenleitner, and C. SzaboKnotik (Vienna, 2001), 85-99; Rogers Brubaker, Nationalism Reframed: Nation
hood and the National Question in the New Europe (New York, 1996). Brubaker

examines the triangular quality that characterized the relationship of Eastern
European German communities to Germany and to their host states in the inter
war period. In an otherwise thoughtful book Brubaker’s characterization of pre
war nationalism among those communities is badly flawed. He proposes that Ger
man nationalism in pre-1918 Austria was irredentist in nature, a commonly held
belief about Austro-Germans that the sources do not confirm (115-16).
9. Hungarian minorities in Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and Romania had a
strong sense of a diasporic relationship to the Hungarian state. The situation of
formerly Austrian or Hungarian Jews in Poland or Romania was particularly com
plicated by the fact that their religious identity defined them out of the nation in
those states. Especially in Romania but also in Poland, religious belief defined the

When Is a Diaspora Not a Diaspora?

243

particulars of national identity. Many Austrian Jews in Galicia and the Bukovina
considered their own identity in terms of allegiance to the anational imperial state
that they rightly perceived had protected them from Polish, Romanian, or Ukrain
ian anti-Semitism. In Czechoslovakia Jews could choose to identify themselves as
part of the Czech nation or they could even choose to list themselves simply as Jews
in the census (often a means of diminishing the number of those who reported
themselves as Germans in the interwar period). However, both the German and
Czech nationalist movements were often characterized by anti-Semitism both
before and after 1918, making national identification for Jews more difficult. On
Jewish dilemmas in post-1918 Eastern Europe, see Hannah Arendt, The Origins of
Totalitarianism (New York, 1958), chapter 9; Marsha L. Rozenblit, Reconstructing
a National Identity: The Jews ofHabsburg Austria during World War I (Oxford and
New York, 2001).
10. On imperial attempts to create dynastic patriotism, see Daniel Unowsky,
“Reasserting Empire: Habsburg Imperial Celebrations after the Revolutions of
1848-1849,” in Staging the Past: The Politics of Commemoration in Habsburg Cen
tral Europe, 1848 to the Present, ed. Maria Bucur and Nancy M. Wingfield (West
Lafayette, Ind., 2001), 13-45.
11. See Gerald Stourzh, “Die Gleichberechtigung der Volksstamme als Verfassungsprinzip, 1848-1918,” in Die Habsburgermonarchie, 1848-1918, vol. 3, Die
Volker des Reiches, ed. Adam Wandruszka and Peter Urbanitsch (Vienna, 1980),
975-1206; see, more generally, Stourzh’s excellent Die Gleichberechtigung der
Nationalitdten in der Verfassung und Verwaltung Osterreichs, 1848-1918 (Vienna,
1985). On the bureaucracy, see Karl Megner, Beamte: Wirtschafts- und
sozialgeschichtliche Aspekte des k.k. Beamtentums (Vienna, 1986); Karl Hugelmann, ed., Das Nationalitdtenrecht des alien Osterreich (Vienna and Leipzig, 1934).
On the conflict over schools, see Hannelore Burger, Sprachenrecht und Sprachengerechtigkeit im osterreichischen Unterrichtswesen, 1867-1918 (Vienna, 1995).
12. King, Budweisers, 114.
13. On the Moravian Compromise, see Horst Glassl, Der Mahrische Ausgleich
(Munich, 1967); Robert Luft, “Die Mittelpartei des mahrischen Grossgrundbesitzes 1879 bis 1918: Zur Problematik des Ausgleiches in Mahren und Bohmen,” in
Die Chance der Verstdndigung: Ansichten und Absdtze zu ubernationaler Zusammenarbeit in den bdhmischen Ldndern 1848-1918, ed. Ferdinand Seibt (Munich, 1987),
187-244; T. Mills Kelly, “Taking It to the Streets: Czech National Socialists in
1908,” Austrian History Yearbook 29 (1998): 93-112; Pieter M. Judson, Exclusive
Revolutionaries: Liberal Politics, Social Experience, and National Identity in the
Austrian Empire, 1848-1914 (Ann Arbor, Mich., 1996), 262-64.
14. For a full summary of the literature on literate Austro-German attitudes
toward Wilhemine Germany, see Kirchhoff, Die Deutschen. For a careful statisti
cal analysis of German speakers’ tax contributions and so-called national property
in Bohemia, see Heinrich Rauchberg, Der nationale Besitzstand in Bohmen, 2 vols.
(Leipzig, 1905). On Schonerer, see Andrew Whiteside, The Socialism of Fools:
Georg Ritter von Schonerer and Austrian Pan-Germanism (Berkeley and Los Ange
les, 1975). While statistics on tax payment confirmed German preeminence in the
economy, another form of statistic meant to measure cultural superiority; those

244

The Heimat Abroad

measuring literacy, for example, favored the Czechs. See, for example, Adelbert
Rom, “Der Bildungsgrad der Bevolkerung Osterreichs und seine Entwicklung seit
1880 mit besonderer Beriicksichtigung der Sudeten- und Karpathenlander,” Statistische Monatsschrift 19 (1914): 589-642.
15. Czech states’ rights nationalism, for example, insisted on the territorial
integrity of Bohemia, Moravia, and Austrian Silesia. Peter Bugge, “Czech NationBuilding, National Self-Perception, and Politics, 1780-1914” (Ph.D. diss., Univer
sity of Aarhus, 1994), especially 103-20; Bruce Garver, The Young Czech Party,
1874-1901, and the Emergence of a Multi-Party System (New Haven, 1978), 49-60.
16. Laurence Cole, "Fiir Gott, Kaiser und Vaterland”: Nationale Identitat der
deutschsprachigen Bevolkerung Tirols, 1860-1914 (Frankfurt am Main, 2000). On
Bohemia, see Jan Kfen, Die Konfliktgemeinschaft: Tschechen und Deutsche,
1870-1918 (Munich, 2000).
17. Lawyer Israel Kohn of Budweis/Budejovice served on the Bohmerwaldbund’s executive board from 1884 until his death in 1917. Deutscher Bohmerwaldbund, “Bundesleitungsmitglieder 1884-1934,” in Funfzig Jahre Deutscher Bohmerwaldbund (Budweis, 1934), 2. On the issue of Jewish schools and the German
School Association, see Pieter M. Judson, “ ‘Whether Race or Conviction Should
be the Standard’: National Identity and Liberal Politics in Nineteenth-Century
Austria,” Austrian History Yearbook 22 (1991); 76-9518. On the challenges of regionalism in Wilhelmine Germany, see Celia Applegate, A Nation of Provincials: The German Idea of Heimat (Berkeley, Calif., I99°);
Alon Confino, The Nation as Local Metaphor: Wiirttemberg, Imperial Germany,
and National Memory, 1871-1918 (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1997); Thomas Serrier,
‘“Deutsche Kulturarbeit in der Ostmark’: Der Mythos vom deutschen Vorrang
und die Grenzproblematik in der Provinz Posen (1871-1914),” and Gunter
Riederer, “Zwischem ‘Kilbe,’ ‘Coiffe,’ und Kaisergeburtstag: Die Schwierigkeiten
Nationaler und regionaler Identitatsstiftung in Elsass-Lothringen (1870-1918),”
both in Die Nationalisierung von Grenzen: Zur Konstruktion nationaler Identitat in
sprachlich gemischten Grenzregionen, ed. Michael G. Muller and Rolf Petri (Mar
burg, 2002), 13-34,109-36.
19. On the general problem of nationalism and the civil service, see Megner,
Beamte, especially 245-58. By 1910 the number of Bohemian provincial civil ser
vants of Czech-speaking background far outstripped their relative percentage in
the Bohemian population. See Hugelmann, Das Nationalitdtenrecht, 355.
20. See the articles “Mittel und Wege zur Erhaltung des deutschen Beamtenstandes in den bedrohten Gebieten” and “Deutscher Beamten-Nachwuchs im
Kampfgebiete” in Mitteilungen des Vereins Sudmark {MVS) 1909, 3-7.
21. For a suggestive comparison of the relative successes of Czech and German
nationalists in appealing to working-class or peasant audiences, see Karl F. Bahm,
“Beyond the Bourgeoisie: Rethinking Nation, Culture, and Modernity in Nine
teenth-Century Central Europe,” Austrian History Yearbook 29 (1998): 19-35.
22. MVS, Feb. 1909,41-42. This and all other translations in this chapter are my
own unless otherwise noted. See also Bahm, “Beyond the Bourgeoisie.” In some
industrialized regions (e.g., Marburg/Maribor in Styria) German nationalist
strategies were clearly more effective than in others (Bohemia, Silesia), as compar
ative census data suggests.

When Is a Diaspora Not a Diaspora?

245

23. On the German Workers Party (Deutsche Arbeiter Partei), which elected
three deputies to the Austrian Parliament in 1911, see Lothar Hobelt, Kornblume
und Kaisemdler: Die deutschfreiheitliche Parteien Altdsterreichs, 1882-1918 (Vienna
and Munich, 1993), 242-47; Harald Bachmann, “Sozialstruktur und Parteientwicklung im nordwestbdhmischen Kohlenrevier vor dem Zusammenbruch der
Monarchic,” Bohemia 10 (1969): 270-86; and Andrew Whiteside, Austrian National
Socialism before 1918 (The Hague, 1962).
24. Kirchhoff, Die Deutschen, 171-202.
25. Deutsches Jahrbuch fur Osterreich. Anschriftenwerk in Berufen selbststdndig
tdtiger Deutschdsterreicher (Vienna, 1913). This edition describes each of the asso
ciations and lists membership and financial statistics.
26. Austrian school law required the presence of an average of forty school-age
children over a three-year period in order to qualify that community for a govern
ment-funded school in a given language. Both the Czech and German School
Associations built schools in communities with too few children and hoped that
their efforts would eventually produce enough children to require the government
to assume funding responsibilities for their schools. On policy and its administra
tion, particularly where language was concerned, see Burger, Sprachenrecht und
Sprachengerechtigkeit, especially lOO-iii.
27. Articles and reports in the publications of the Czech School Association or
the Czech National Association for the Bohemian Woods consistently raise the
issue of funding and suggest that the German School Association and other
nationalist organizations were controlled by foreign (German) interests. See fre
quent examples from the Zprdva o cinnosti Ndrodni Jednoty Posumavske, 1906,
1907, 1908, 26-27, and the Vestnik Ustfedni Matice Skolske (Prague, 1908).
28. See the essay on the three different categories of children served by the Ger
man School Association in Der Kampf urns Deutschtum 2 (1913): 24-29. For a sim
ilar essay see Der getreue Eckart: Halbmonatschrift fur das deutsche Haus, 1908,
252. Attitudes among non-German speakers toward the issue of German schooling
varied by region and occasionally by community. In Southern Styria and
Carinthia, for example, Slovene-speaking parents often believed that a Germanlanguage education would bring greater social and employment opportunities for
their children and the German School Association did little to discourage this
belief. See Maria Kurz, “Der Volksschulstreit in der Siidsteiermark in der Zeit der
Dezemberverfassung” (BA thesis. University of Vienna, 1986).
29. Since nationalists worked so hard to delineate and prove the differences that
separated their two imagined communities (one had culture, the other didn’t), they
were unlikely to recognize the large number of schools created by their competition
as a benefit. This competition created work for Austria’s highest administrative
and supreme courts (Verwaltungsgerichthof and Reichsgericht), whose judges con
stantly ruled on cases involving language, parents, and schools in the period
1890-1918. See Stourzh, “Die Gleichberechtigung,” and Burger, Sprachenrecht und
Sprachengerechtigkeit.
30. On the dangers of bilingualism, see, for example, J. Zemmrich, Sprachgrenze und Deutschtum in Bdhmen (Braunschweig, 1902), 7-10. The concept of a
language frontier was an ideological construction created by nationalists in the
1880S that imagined an uneasy coexistence of two cultures fundamentally opposed

246

The Heimat Abroad

to each other and engaged in a zero-sum struggle to the death. Cultural mixing
among peoples within a given region (for many different reasons, such as personal
or economic) in fact often constituted a norm that nationalists preferred not to rec
ognize. See Judson, “Frontier Germans.”
31. On the boycott movements, see Catherine Albrecht, “The Rhetoric of Eco
nomic Nationalism in the Bohemian Boycott Campaigns of the Late Habsburg
Monarchy,” Austrian History Yearbook 32 (2001): 47-67. On competitive charita
ble giving and Christmas gifts, see Der Kampf urns Deutschtum, 1913-12, 25.
32. On nationalist orphanages, see Bericht iiber die Thdtigkeit des Bundes der
Deutschen in Bohmen (Prague, 1907-10); MVS, 1910, 57. On the Sudmark see
Eduard Staudinger, “Die Sudmark: Aspekte der Programmatik und Struktur eines
deutschen Schutzvereins in der Steiermark bis 1914,” in Geschichte der Deutschen,
ed. Rumpler and Suppan, 130-54; Pieter M Judson, “Connect the Dots: The Sud
mark Frontier Settlement Program” in Teachers, Tourists, and Terrorists: Nation
alizing the Language Frontier in Habsburg Central Europe, 1880-1925, manuscript.
On other colonization efforts, see Deutsches Jahrbuch fiir Osterreich. Most provin
cial organizations could not raise the enormous sums that a serious settlement pro
gram required.
33. On the Czech nationalist self-image as colonizers in German-speaking
regions of Bohemia, see K. Vitvera, Cous od Zacatku Ceske Kolonisace (Prague,
1907) (Published by the Narodni Jednota Severoceske); Ceske Mensiny a Mensinove Skolstvi (Prague, 1911); and Mark Cornwall, “The Struggle on the Czech-Ger
man Language Border, 1880-1940,” English Historical Review (September 1994):
914-51-

34. On Sudeten Germans’ demands for special treatment at the hands of the
Third Reich because of disabilities suffered under the interwar Czech regime, see
Volker Zimmermann, Die Sudetendeutschen im NS Staat (Munich, 1999); and Ralf
Gebel, Heim ins Reich! Konrad Henlein und der Reichsgau Sudetenland, 1938-1945
(Munich, 1999).
35. On the orphan problem, see Dr. Karl Schucker, Waisenheim des Bundes der
Deutschen in Bohmen. Jahrbuch der Deutschen Jugendfursorge in Bohmen (Prague,
1909), 21. On Sudmark problems with settlers’ authenticity, see MVS, 1907-8,
288-89.
36. For a detailed analysis of the politics of the census, see Emil Brix, Die
Umgangssprache in Altbsterreich zwischen Agitation und Assimilation (Vienna,
1982).
37. For population statistics (and for subsequent paragraphs) on Galicia and
the Bukovina, see Wandruszka and Urbanitsch, eds.. Die Habsburger Monarchie,
1848-1918, vol. 3, 38, table i.
38. On the organization and its relations with Jews in the Bukovina, see
Deutsches Jahrbuch fiir Osterreich, 208; Deutscher Kalender fiir die Bukowina, 1903,
1904, 1910; and Franz Lang, ed., Buchenland Hundertfiinfzig Jahre Deutschtum in
der Bukovina (Munich, 1961).
39. The association promoted links to other Eastern (Hungarian) communities
of German speakers, such as those in Transylvania and the Banat, founding the
Association of Carpathian Germans in 1910. See Emanuel Turczynski, “Das

When Is a Diaspora Not a Diaspora?

247

Vereinswesen der Deutschen in der Bukovina,” in Buchenland, ed. Lang, 113.
40. Turczynski, “Das Vereinswesen,” 118-19, reproduces the Germans’ memo
randum of November 17,1918. A provisional Romanian government in the Bukov
ina agreed to fourteen of the fifteen demands (the exception was the demand to
maintain the German-language status of the university in Czernowitz). A week
later, representatives of the German Council (Deutscher Volksrat) voted over
whelmingly for annexation by Romania. Subsequent Romanian policy in the
realm of education is analyzed superbly by Livezeanu, Cultural Politics, chapter 2.
On the internal conflicts of the 1930s and the resettlement in 1940, see Turczynski,
“Das Vereinswesen,” 123-30.
41. On debates over Sudeten German identities, see Tara E. Zahra, “Custody
Battles: Nationalizing Childhood in Bohemia and Moravia, 1900-1945” (Ph.D.
diss.. University of Michigan, 2005); see also Zahra, “Reclaiming Children for the
Nation: Germanization, National Ascription, and Democracy in the Bohemian
Lands, 1900-1945,” Central European History 37 (2004): 499-541. For examples
cited by Zahra of Sudeten Germans demanding teacher exemptions from
Wehrmacht service, given the alleged need to recolonize a weakened German com
munity, see Meldungen aus dem Reich, Nr. 37, Jan. 8,1940; Bundesarchiv R 58/ 145
F. i-i SD Bericht, Dec. i, 1939; Meldungen aus dem Reich, Nr. 333, Nov. 9,1942, p.
5008; Karlsbad, June 12, 1941, an Herrn Reichsminister des Innern from
Regierungsprasident in Karlsbad Bundesarchiv, R 1501 127122, Reichsministerium
des Innern, Grenzlandfursorge Sudetenland, Regierungsbezirk Karlsbad p. 128, I/5
a. 1225/41.

